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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MELVIN J. STAKER,
PlaintiffRespondent,
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
vs.
HUNTINGTON CLEVELA~D
IRRIGATION COMPANY,
a Utah corporation,

:

No. 18203
DefendantAppe 11 ant.

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
Plaintiff brought suit against Defendant Irrigation
Company to recover overpayments made by Plaintiff to Defendant
on water in the Joe's Valley project constructed under the
Bureau of Reclamation.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The lower Court found the facts in favor of the
Plaintiff, awarding Plaintiff judgment in the principal
amount of $5,031.50, together with interest in the

arnount~of

$3,283.00 and costs in the sum of $29.70, for a total judgment
of $8,344.25.
REiIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks an affirmance of the lower Court's
decision.
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-2STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant's recitation of the facts deals almost
exclusively with procedur_al matters.

For purposes of clarity

and response, the following factual summary is in two parts.
A.

SUBS_TAl~TIVE FACTS. 1

In March of 1966, the

Defendant solicited its shareholders,. including the Plaintiff,
to subscribe for Joe's Valley project water, and stated in
the invitation to the stockholders that a $1.00 per acre foot
charge would be made for each acre foot subscribed to or for.
Pursuant to such invitation, Plaintiff subscribed
for 2,500 acre feet and made payment in the sum of $2,500.00
to the Defendant company..

Defendant did not readily find

subscribers for all water for which its shareholders were
eligible, and accordingly it invited additional subscriptions
from those who had already subscribed, including Plaintiff.
As a result, Plaintiff subscribed for an additional 500 acre
feet, making a total of 3,000 acre feet, and paid an additional
$500.00 to the Defendant Company.
During the years 1967, 1968 and 1969, the Defendant
irrigation company sent billings to the Plaintiff for 3,000
acre feet of project water at the rate of $1.55 per acre
foot.

In its billings to

~laintiff

and other shareholders,

1

.
Th'e f acts as recited
were, for the most part, expressly
found by the District Court (R. 41) and ar~ not in dispute on
appeal. Where recited facts were not included in the Court's
written findings, specific refe-rence is made to the trial
transcript.
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-3Defendant indicated that there would be adjustments in the
water actually received by the shareholders, and that the
Irrigation Company would reimburse the stockholders for any
overpayment for water not received.

Plaintiff paid as per

the billings.
In due course, Plaintiff's participation in the
project water was cut first from 3,000 acre feet to 2,200
acre feet, and then cut a second time to 1,900 acre feet and
a third time to 1,890 acre feet.

The project water thus cut

back from the shareholders, notably Plaintiff, 2 was transferred
to Utah Power and Light along with other project water for
use in its power generating facilities in Emery County.

In

1975, and pursuant to agreement, the Power Company paid to
the Irrigation Company $5.00 for each acre foot of project
water

r~leased

or relinquished to it by the Irrigation Company

or its stockholders..

This money, by agreement, was to reim-

burse the Irrigation Company and its stockholders for preparing
their lands and enlarging their canals and ditches in order
to be able to use the project water.

The money employed' by

the Irrigation Company had come from the stockholder assessments and subscription fees referred to above.
Sometime during 1975 the money received by the

2
Only a few of Defendant's shareholders were affected by
the cutbacks, and according to the testimony the impact on
Plaintiff was over three times as great as·on anyone else
( R. 9 7 and 9 8 ) •
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-4Irrigation Company from Utah Power and Light was used by the
Irrigation Company to satisfy a debt it had with the Emery
3
County Water Conservancy District, and none bf it was used
to reimburse shareholders for the subscription fee and the
assessments paid on the project water which they were obliged
to relinquish ..
After learning of the payment to the Conservancy
District, Plaintiff discussed the promised refund with
Defendant's president and was assured, "You definitely are
going to get your money."

(Tr. 36)

Plaintiff relied on this

assurance {Tr. 37), as well as other assurances from the
Defendant's president, up until the latter was replaced in
that position (Tr. 38).

These conversations were within the

time frame contemplated by the applicable statute of limita4
.
t ions.

About two years after the change in Irrigation

Company officials, Plaintiff, for the first time, was advised
by the new president that he would not be paid (Tr. 39). 5
Plaintiff filed this action on March 29, 1979.

3

By making payment to the Conservancy District when it
did, the Defendant Irrigation Company apparently received a
reduction in the amount of its debt (Tr. 37).
4

There were conversations in the latter part of 1975
(Tr. 37) and later (Tr. 38).

5

Mr. James Staker, who was a member of Defendant's board
of directors during all relevant times, learned of the decision
not to reimburse Plaintiff after leaving :the board in 1978
(Tr . 92).
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B.

PROCEDURAL FACTS.

The statement of procedural

facts contained in Defendant's brief is technically accurate,
but incomplete and creates misimpressions.
Defendant's procedural factual synopsis seeks to
take advantage of an absence in the record of information
concerning matters which were never before at issue.
For example, Defendant asserts that notices of
trial setting were mailed to E. J. Skeen rather than Thomas
O. Parker.
Egypt.

Counsel asserts that Thomas

o.

Parker was in

The record does reflect that E. J. Skeen has the same

mailing address as Parker, but since the issue was not raised
in the trial· court, there is no explanation in the record as
to why the trial Court sent the mailings to Skeen.

It is

reasonable to :o-i.ssume that if such issue had been raised, the
trial Court could have made a record thereon.
Defendant's counsel asserts that he was retained
two days before trial, though in the absence of a motion for
a continuance or some objection to the trial going forward
there is no record which addresses the matter of prior contacts
between Mr. Litizzette, Mr. Parker, Mr. Skeen and Plaintiff's
counsel, nor of their various contact$ with the Court or with
the Defendant.

Such facts were not broached at the time of

trial for the reason that Defendant's counsel made no issue
of the notice of trial setting n.or of the Shortness of. time
in which he had been involved.
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-6If the issues noted would have been raised then the
trial Court could have addressed the same, and the record
could have been more complete thereon.

Defendant's effort to

take advantage of them at this stage does not seem appropriate.
ARUGMENT
POIN'r I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN DENYING DEFENDANT' S MOTION MADE. ON THE DAY
OF TRIAL TO AMEND THE ANSWER TO ALLOW THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DEFENSE
Under Rule 12(h) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the
Defendant waives defenses not presented in his answer.

That

section is applicable to the defense of the statute of limitations.

Tygesen v. Magna Water Company, 13 Utah 2d 397, 375

Pac. 456 (1962).

In denying the Defendant's motion to amend, filed
the morning of trial, the trial Court observed,
This case has been set, I believe, twice
before. And, in other words, it was filed
clear back in March of 1979; the exact dates
and amounts claimed.are set forth in particu-.
larity in the complaint. So that if the
Defendants wanted to take advantage of the
statute of limitations, they had plenty ofopportunity to do so. Then the Plaintiff
would have had the opportunity at least, to
approach his case from the stand point of
when did his cause of action arise and this
sort of thing. We think it unfair to present
it at this late date. • • •
[Tr. 143]
[Emphasis added.]
The Court's finding of "unfairness" is amply supported.

At the beginning of the trial, Plaintiff's counsel

advised the Court as follows,
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-7. • . [A]nd in addition we have not prepared to
address that issue because it has never been
raised.
And we simple have not undertaken to
prepare the case if put in this posture. we
advi~ed through responses through the interrogatories early on exactly what our position
was, specifically every document that we would
introduce. And it's never been raised and
here we are. The first indication I ever had
was yesterday afternoon. So we're simply not
ready to try that and I think it would prejudice
our position.
[Tr. 8]
Under Rule 15(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
leave to amend should be freely given "when justice so
requires."

In those cases where the Court has granted leave

to amend, there appears uniformly to have been a finding that
no prejudice resulted to the other party.
et al. v. Houtz et

al~,

See, e.g., Evans

57 Utah 216, 193 Pac. 858 (1920);

Shay v. Union ?ac. R. Co., 47 Utah 252, 153 Pac. 31 (1915);
Benson v. Railroad, 35 Utah 241, 99 Pac. 1072 (1909).
In addition to the finding of "unfairness", the
exercise of discretion by the trial court is supported by the
following findings appearing at page 45 of the record:
22. That Plaintiff oleaded his case with
specificity, settingLforth not only his
theory but also particular dates and the
payments made for which he claimed reimbursement.
23. That further, in response to discovery
procedures employed by Defendant, Plaintiff
responded with specificity, setting forth the
exact nature of his claim and the exact
·documents on which he intended to rely,
including the date of those documents.
24. That Plaintiff further offered to make
all documents on which he intended to rely
available to Defendant for inspection and
photocopying.
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-825. That the evidence introduced at trial,
and on which Plaintiff relied, consisted of
the precise documents which it had outlined
in its response to Defendant's discovery.
The Court relied on the case of Goeltz v. Continental
Bank and T:rust Co., 5 Utah 2d 204, 299 P.2d 832 (1956), which
deals specifically wi.th a delinquent motion to amend to
include the statute of limitations.

That case sheds light on

the phrase, "when justice so requires. 116

The Court said,

Statutes of limitations as statutes of repose
have a useful function in our .law systeme
Sometimes they prevent the prosecution of a
stale claim after proof of the facts are
unavailable, and in such a case the interests
of justice would require that leave to amend
be freely granted. In other ca$es .such ·
defense merely prevents a recovery of a just
claim. • • • Here defendant seeks leave to
amend after all the evidence is in, even
though all the facts upon which this defense
is based have been fully known by the bank,
since the original certificates were .deposited
with it in March of 1947 and no new evidence
was discovered during the trial which made
this defense available where it had not been
available under the facts known by the bank in
the first instance.
[at 207.]
[Emphasis
added.]
The court in Goeltz went on to address Rule 15(b)
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows amendmen-ts,· i'when
the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved
thereby."

In a comment alluding to both lS(a) and lS(b),

the Supreme Court said,

6

As heretofore noted, amendments are to be freely allowed
"when justice so requires."
[Rule 15 (a) Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure]
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-9The facts which were determinative of that
question were known to defendant from the
inception of plaintiff's claim and were fully
pleaded in defendant's answer. Defendant's
only failure in pleading was to assert the
statute of limitations as a defense to plaintiff's
claim, and that is the only amendment which it
asked leave to make . • • ~These rules require
that leave to amend be freely given when
justice so requires or when the presentation
of the merits of the action will be subserved.
As we have already seen, justice does not
require this amendment, nor does the presentation of the merits of the action so require
it, for to defeat a claim by the bar of the
statute of limitations is not a determination
of a c·ase on its merits.
[at 208.]
[Emphasis
added.]
In the case before the Court, the trial Court found
that the statute of limitations didn't vary the substantive
matters of the case {Tr. 143).
"staleness~,

There was no problem with

and Plaintiff's evidence was clear and succinct.

There was an indication of a defense witness not being able
to remember some detail after the expiration of time covered
by the case, but the Court found such detail was not "really
material", and not such as "would materially alter the decision
of the Court."

(Tr. 144.)

The burden on Defendant-Appellant in this Court· is
a stiff one.

The applicable standard governing trial court

discretion was set forth by this Court in Searle v .. Searle,
522 P.2d 697 (Utah, 1974) in which it was said,
The actions of the trial court are indulged
with a presumption of validity, and the
burden is upon appellant to prove such a
· serious inequity as to manifest a clear abuse
of discretion.
[at 700.]
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-10To the degree that the Court's exercise of discretion
is dependant on findings, the following is applicable,
• • • [T]his court is constrained to look at
the whole of the evidence. in the light favorable to the trial court's findings, including
· any fair inferences to be drawn from the
evidence and all of the circumstances shown.
The trial court's findings shall not be
disturbed unless the evidence is such that
all reasonable minds would be persuaded to
the contrary..
[Hanover Ltd. v. Fields, 568
Pa2d 751 (Utah, 1977), at 753.]
It should be noted that the failure to plead the
statute of limitations may not have been inadvertent or
unintentional, since there is evidence in the record which
would support a position that Plaintiff's cause of action did
not arise until the money received from Utah Power and Light
was misapplied by the Irrigation Company.

Up until then,

Plaintiff had every reason to expect that he would be fully
reimbursed out of this money.

Even after such misapplication

by the Defendant, it continued to assure Plaintiff that he
would be paid ..

On this ground Defendant's original counsel

may well have determined that there was a sound basis for
avoiding a strict application of the statute of limitations.
Since the proposed amendment would have required
proof of matters not contemplated by Plaintiff in its preparation, and since

then~

was a complete absence of any surprises

in Plaintiff's evidence, and no proof problems relating to
"staleness", and since the trial resulted ~nan "adjudication
on the merits", it was fitting and proper and well within the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-11-

Court's discretion to deny the proposed amendment, and, in

fact, to have allowed it could have "prevented recovery of a
just claim," and could have· hindered rather than fostered a
fair and just conclusion.

An amendment which will not further

the interests of justice should not be allowed.

See Bradford

v. Alvey and Sons, 621 P.2d 1240 (Utah, 1980). 7
POINT II
THE DEFENDANT CANNOT CLAIM IMPROPER
NOTICE OF TRIAL WHEN SUCH ISSUE WAS
NOT RAISED IN THE TRIAL COURT
As noted in the factual summary, the record is
skimpy regarding the procedure employed in giving notice of
trial.

That is so because the issue was not raised in the

trial Court.
Since the Defendant appeared for trial and raised
no objection regarding the notice, and did not question the
sufficiency thereof nor the propriety of the trial going
forward, it is too late. to do so at this stage.

As was said

in Hanover Ltd. v .. Fie_lds, supra at 753,
• • • [I]ssues not raised in the pleadings nor
presented at trial • . . cannot be considered
for the first time on appeal.
POINT III
THE COURT PROPERLY AWARDED INTEREST
In Bjork v. April Industries, Inc., 560 P.2d 315
(Utah, 1977) this Court said,

7

lihile this case involved Rule 15 (b} Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, rather than 15(a), the principle is the same.
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-12As to the al lowanc.e of interest before
judgment, this Court has heretofore spoken,
and the law in Utah is clear, viz: where the
damage is complete and the amount of the loss
is fixed as of a particular time, and that
loss can be measured by facts and figures,
interest should be allowed from· that time and
not fr9m the date of the judgment. On the
other hand, where damages are incomplete or
cannot be calculated with mathematical accu~acy,
such as in case of personal injury, wrongful
death, defamation of character, false imprisonment, etc., the-amount of the damage must be
ascertained and assessed by the trier of the
fact at the trial, and in such cases prejudgment
interest in not allowed.
[at 317.]
[Emphasis
added.]
Applying the standard thus enunciated to the facts of this
case, the following appears:
In paragraph number eleven of his complaint (R. 2)
-Plaintiff alleged as follows:
11. That the excess payments made by
Plaintiff are as follows, to-wit:
(a) Overpayment on subscription,
$1.00 per acre foot for 1,110 acre feet (3,000
less 1,890), which totals $1,110.00.
(b) Excess 1967 assessment, $1.55
on 1,110 acre feet, which totals $1,720.50.
(c) Excess 1968 assessment, $1.55
on 1,110 acre feet, which totals $1,720.50. ·
(d) Excess 1969 assessment, $1.55
on 310 acre feet (2,200 acre feet less 1,890
acre feet), which totals $480.50.
Total amount of the foregoing is FIVE THOUSAND
THIRTY-ONE AND 50/100 DOLLARS ($5,031.50).
There was no factual dispute as to the amounts in
ques·tion, and the Court awarded Plaintiff judgment for the
amount alleged in his complaint.

The Court further found

that the final adJustment on Plaintiff's oro-iect water
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-13occurred during the year 1972, and accordingly the proper
refund amounts were fully fixed dur·ing that year (R. 44).
The Court awarded interest beginning January 1, 1973.
Defendant has recited language from Am. Jur.
indicating that interest should be- awarded "as a.result of
the justice of the individual case."

22 Am. Jur. 2d §·179.

In this connection, i t is pointed out that by January 1,
1973, when interest commenced to run by Court decree, Plaintiff
had already been without the use of his money for several
years, and further when the Irrigation Company elected to
apply the Utah Power and Light money for its own purposes
rather than to make refunds to shareholders, it received a
·- direct benefit by negotiating a reduction of the debt it owed
to the Emery County Water Conservancy District.

(Tr. 37)

What may be considered as relating to "the justice
of the individual case" are the facts set forth in the following testimony of Irrigation Company board of directors member
Dick Allen, extracted during cross-examination.

After acknow-

!edging that the money received from Utah Power and Light had
been paid to the Emery County Water Conservancy District,
with none going to shareholders, Allen said {Tr. 125):
Q {by Mr. Mclff) All right.
Did you
discuss thereafter that you would try to raise
the money and pay the _shareholders some other
way?

A Wel 1, there was some arg-ument but no
firm decisions because the attorney said we
signed no contract and so we weren't liable.
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Q I see. So his advice was, JUSt not to
pay those shareholders based on the fact there
was no written contract signed?
A

Yes.

.
. writing
. .
Nothing
in
to prove 1. t

Mr. Mciff:
all I have.

I see.

All right.

•

8

That's

In light of Bjork v. Ap_ril Industries, Inc.,
supra, plaintiff was likely entitled to interest as a matter
of law, though if an award of interest were discretionary with the
district judge, then such discretion was well exercised and
is. entitled to a presumption of validity under the case law
heretofore cited.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the trial Court should be affirmed
in all respects, and Plaintiff should be awarded his costs on
appeal.

Respectfully submitted

this~/ '!i:tday

of June,

1982.

8

While apparently there were no signed contracts, the
promised refunds were proven by three written instruments
(Findings number 10.-13, R. 42-43), by statements made to
Plaintiff by Irrigation.Company officials (Findings number
14, R. 43), and by two minute entries from meetings of
Defendant's board of directors (Findings number 14, R. 43).
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-15AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I served two copies of the
foregoing Brief of Respondent upon Defendant-Appellant's
attorney by mailing the same, with first-class postage thereon
fully prepaid, on

/)/'} 11d

the~.

day of June, 1982, addressed as

follows:
Mr. S. v. Litizzette
178 South Main Street
Helper, Utah
84526
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